Association for Information Systems

AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
ICIS 1989 Proceedings

International Conference on Information Systems
(ICIS)

1989

A FIELD-BASED INVESTIGATION INTO
THE EFFECT OF EXPERT SYSTEM USE ON
THE INFORMATION PROCESSING
CAPACITY OF THE FIRM
John J. Sviokla
Harvard University

Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis1989
Recommended Citation
Sviokla, John J., "A FIELD-BASED INVESTIGATION INTO THE EFFECT OF EXPERT SYSTEM USE ON THE
INFORMATION PROCESSING CAPACITY OF THE FIRM" (1989). ICIS 1989 Proceedings. 52.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis1989/52

This material is brought to you by the International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted
for inclusion in ICIS 1989 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.

A FIELD-BASED INVESTIGATION INTO THE EFFECT OF EXPERT SYSTEM
USE ON THE INFORMATION PROCESSING CAPACITY OF THE FIRM
John J. Sviokla
Graduate School of Business Administration
Harvard University

ABSTRACT
To date, there have been many reports on the use of decision support systems (DSS) and knowledge-

based systems (KBS) in organizations. Little of this research evaluates the impact of commercial
systems on the performance of the organization using the system. This study attempts to shed some
light on this intellectual domain.

This paper reports on a field-based investigation into the effects of the use of MUDMAN™ (a
commercial expert systems product) on the information-processing capacity of N.L. Baroid, an oil
services firm. The study uses the notions of organizational programs as defined by March and Simon
and operationalizes the information processing capacity framework £ut forth by Galbraith to show how
information-processing capacity was affected when the MUDMAN system was used at Baroid.

1.

INTRODUCTION

Despite the large number of reported cases and research

articles, few investigators have chosen to focus on the
effects the use of these tools have on the user organization.

Luconi, Malone, and Scott-Morton (1985) note three
defining features of an expert system (ES). First, an ES

This article will focus on how the use of an expert system

uses special-purpose knowledge about a particular problem
domain; second, it uses symbolic reasoning rather than only
numeric calculation; and third, it performs better than
nonexpert humans. In comparing ES, DSS, and Expert

had an impact in one firm.
Scott-Morton (1984), perhaps as a result of his early work
in an extensive review of over 300 articles on Management
Support Systems (MSS), noted a lack of research into
changes caused by MSS, saying "much work has been done
on the impacts of traditional management information
systems, but virtually nothing on the impacts of MSS"

Support Systems (ESS), the authors distinguish four
categories:
data, procedures, goal/constraints, and
strategies. In a DSS, the computer and the human share
responsibilities for managing data, use of procedures,
setting goals and constraints, but the problem-solving
strategies are left to the human. In an expert support

(p. 31).

system, the computer shares the realm of flexible problemsolving strategies as well. For our purposes we will use the
definition of an ESS, as defined by Luconi, Malone, and
Scott-Morton, but for convenience we will call it an ES.

In a more recent evaluation of the research literature in
DSS, group DSS (GDSS) and ES, Benbasat and Nault
(1988) found a similar hole in the intellectual fabric of the
field. They categorized the literature into "design" and

1.1 Impacts of Expert Systems

"effects of use" camps. Within the effects of use they found
that most of the work had evaluated the effects of DSS and

GDSS on the individual; however, "work on the effects of

EiS use is rare" (p. i). Thus despite a propitious beginning
by one of the founders of the field -- a full twenty-one

Michael Scott-Morton (1967, 1971) provided one of the
very first studies of the impact of decision support systems

(DSS). In a study of a laundry equipment manufacturer's

years ago -- few have endeavored to measure effects of our
nontransaction MIS systems on the organization.

use of a marketing/manufacturing DSS, he found that the
system had a profound impact on the speed of the deci-

sions and the detail of data considered. Moreover, he
discovered that the system helped the organization communicate coherently and concisely about complex manufacturing and marketing trade-offs.

This research study approaches this problem by drawing on

existing theories of information processing capacity
(Galbraith 1973, 1977) and organizational programs
(March and Simon 1958) to create rough measures as a
guide to a field-based investigation.

Since that time we have had books and articles on DSS
(Alter 1980; Bennett 1983; Keen and Scott-Morton 1978)
and, more recently, on ES (Harmon, Maus and Morrissey
1988; Feigenbaum, McCorduck and Nii 1988). (For a
more extensive literature review, sce Sviokla 1986.)

1.2 Methodology

Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead (1986), in a review of case
research in information systems, noted that one important
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motivation for case research occurs when "the research is

Such a set of responses we call ape,fonnance program,

interested in complex problems which cannot be removed
from the setting without destroying the phenomenon" (p.

or simply aprogram. For example, the sounding of the
alarm gong in a fire station initiates such a program. So

7).

does the appearance of a relief applicant at a social
worker's desk. So does the appearance of an automobile

chassis in front of the work station of a worker on the

Bonoma (1985) advocates the use of case research in
environments "where the existing body of knowledge is
insufficient to permit the posing of causal questions, and
when a phenomenon cannot be studied outside the context
in which it naturally occurs" (p. 207).

assembly line-(p. 141).

Galbraith (1977) defines the information-processing
capacity of an organization to be the diversity of the
outputs, the number of different input resources, and the
level of task performance. For example, an organization

Understanding how the use of an expert system has an
impact on a firm's information-processing capacity is
entwined with an understanding of the business process it

is designed to support.

with a high diversity of outputs, a high level of task
performance, and a large number of inputs, has a high
level of information-processing capacity. The operationalization of the three components that make up infurmation-

Hence a case study seemed

appropriate. Yet, to avoid "mindless empiricism" (Hauptmann 1989), two guiding measures were employed:

processing capacity for this study are pragmatic and simple.

organizational program maps and information-processing
capacity.

Input* are defined as the number of data sources used and
people consulted in the delivery of the product or service
(the product/service is defined in Table 1). Outputs are
defined as the number of different versions of the product/
service. The level of task pe,fo,mance is the management's assessment of performance and any available
objective measures. The author rated these measures
within each site.

13 Definition of Measures
The organizational program is operationalized by creating
process-flow diagrams that map out the steps necessary to
execute the task being examined. All flow diagrams have
been generated by the author. (Sce Table 1 for a defini-

tion of task. (The sample unit for each site is the task
organization, also defined in Table 1.)

A second design factor was chosen to sharpen the focus on

measuring impacts. In order to capture the effects of the
ES use on the information-processing capacity and on
organizational programs, a pre-post design was employed,
that is, the behavior of the organization around a narrow
task was compared before and after the use of the tool.

Table 1

The site (Baroid) was selected from a list of over 30

Some Definitions

•

Die task (or, the business task):

potential sites for three reasons. First, it had an expert
system in routine use. (Routine use was defined as used
at least once a day in a nontest decision context.) Second,

The business

task that the expert system is designed to support.

For example, the task for PlanPower (a financial
planning expert system) is "financial planning."
•

77:e task omanization:

the task had substantial tracking and tracing associated
with it, so many documents addressing past decisions and
their effects were available for examination. Third, the
system addressed a nontrivial business problem.

The task organization is

a group of individuals who are active in the
•

creation and delivery of the product/service.

The drawback of the Baroid site was that there were no
active implementation efforts underway -- all sites that

71:ep,uduct The product and/or service which
the task is designed to create (in MUD planning,
the MUD plan is one facet of the product).

were going to use the system were already using it. Thus,

the only "pre" implementation state available to the
researcher was historical reconstruction. Due to the paper
trail kept for the decision process, and the long experience

of the managers involved in the study, the historical
account was rich. Yet, the reliability of self reports is often
suspect and two efforts review with participants and

The operationalization of the first measure, organizational

programs, builds directly on March and Simon's (1958)
notion of an organizational program:

triangulation), discussed below, were used to bolster the
veracity of the accounts to allow for pre-post comparison.

Pe®rmance programs (or programs). We have seen
that under certain circumstances the search and choice

processes are very much abridged.

All data (25 interviews, five day-long site visits, and
voluminous archival data) were gathered by the author.
Having a single rater for all measures has its benefits and
costs. On the one hand, the single observer is more likely
to rate things in a similar manner and to be more consistent. On the other hand, single-viewpoint assessment may

At the limit, an

environmental stimulus may evoke immediately from the

organization a highly complex and organized set of
responses.
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remained important buyer criteria, but customer focus on
cost of the product intensified as drilling muds became
more and more of a commodity.

bias the data. Two methods in the data collection design
are used to strengthen the reliability of the data: review
of data with individuals in the user organization and
triangulation. Yin (1984) and others (Bonoma 1985;

Roethlisberger 1977) have advocated reviewing case
materials with members of the organization under study as

3.

THE ISSUE: MUD ENGINEERING

a means of checking impressions, perspectives, and facts.
This method was employed.

Mud engineering is often challenging. Rigs can cost up to
$500,000 per day to operate; thus, when one stops drilling,

The second reliability-enhancing measure, triangulation
(Bonoma 1985; Jick 1979), is a technique using different

the financial pressure to resume drilling is tremendous.

types of data to triangulate on any particular claim or

blamed" for any trouble because all aspects of exploratory
drilling -- cutting, logging, easing -- occur in the presence

Mud engineers say that mud is "the first thing to be

insight. Three types of data were collected to understand
the nature of the task:
•

interviews

•
•

observation
archival data

of mud. Incorrect or inattentive mud management can
lead to serious well problems such as a "stuck pipe" or a
blowout. Unlike the romantic movie image, which often
shows a happy rig crew applauding a geyser of oil, a
blowout in the oil field can spew out drilling equipment,
injure or kill well hands, and destroy millions of dollars
worth of equipment. Many possible problems - such as
blowouts -- are usually foreshadowed by changes in the

These multiple sources of data allow triangulation of the
rater's interpretation. The combination of these method-

ological efforts attempt to counterbalance the singleobserver bias.
2.

mud and an alert mud engineer can take preventive
measures.
From the oil company's perspective, mud management is
usually a relatively small percentage of its cost. An
offshore well platform might spend $5 to $20 million on
mud in a year. Generally, the cost of mud is approximately
six to eight percent of the drilling operator's costs.

THE COMPANY SETTING

NL Baroid or (Baroid)1 was the largest division of NL
Industries, a conglomerate which provides products and
services to the oil and chemical industries. Baroid's 1985
revenues of $382.7 million accounted for 27.9 percent of
NL Industries' total of $1.4 billion. Specializing in sales of
drilling fluids both to the major oil companies, such as

Even though mud costs are a small share of total costs,
operators are conscious of any controllable expense and
are always anxious to keep mud bills as low as possible.
More important, good mud management can lead to a

Exxon, Gulf, and Shell, and to smaller, independent
producers, Baroid was the largest such supplier in the
world.

more efficient well being drilled, which can mean substan-

tial savings in drilling costs. Furthermore, mud management infiuences overall well quality, which in turn can
affect the value and volume of oil (or other substance)
extracted at the surface.

The 1980s were years of boom and bust of the oil industry.

In 1981, oil reached its highest price. Drilling became
more active, with over 4,000 rigs in operation in the United
States. From this high, the industry dropped to its postWWII low. Prices for crude oil in mid-1986 were near
$10.00 per barrel, threatening to go to $8.00 or even to
$6.00. Drilling activity fell to less than 700 active wells in
the United States.

In order to appreciate what MUDMAN was designed to

do, it is helpful to understand the nature of the mud
engin6er's job. When drilling a well, drilling fluids are
pumped down the center of the drill pipe, exit from nozzles
on the drill bit, and circulate back up to the surface where
they are monitored, cleaned, and recirculated.

Financial figures for Baroid show this industry plunge. In
1981, its revenues were $709.7 million; in 1985, $382.7
million -- a drop of 41.6 percent. During these four years,

Mud is usually a mixture of water, clay, weighting material,
rare earths, and other chemicals. Mud engineers monitor

the company lost approximately half its employees and
trimmed all budgets severely.

and regulate the properties of the drilling fluids to influence the characteristics of the well being drilled, that is, the

"bore hole" characteristics.
Technology leadership had played an important role in
establishing Baroid as a industry leader. Some experts felt
that many of the technical breakthroughs in drilling muds

Ideally, the drilling fluid is

maintained to optimize a number of factors simultaneously:

•
•

had occurred during the 1920-1960 time frame. Since then,
most major oil-service companies carried a full line of
muds. The basis for competition shifted from technology
toward price. Service record, reputation, and expertise

•
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Hole clearing (the removal of cuttings)
The suspension of cuttings and other material
during interruptions in circulation
The removal of sand and cuttings from the mud
(done at the surface)

•

The prevention of caving and sloughing in the hole

•

The control of subsurface pressures

4.1 Pre-MUDMAN: Developing a Mud Plan

Generally, the oil-service company works with the drilling

operator to design the mud plan, which describes what type
of mud will be used at each different stage of the drilling.

Any one mud ingredient may help preserve a number of
factors on this list simultaneously. For example, clay helps
keep the cutting in suspension so that if the circulation of

Previous drilling experience in that location is the primary
information upon which the two participants draw when

the mud stops for any reason, the drilling shavings may not

creating the plan. There is an art to creating effective mud
plans because each well can have very different mud

fall down to the bottom of the bore hole and clog it. Clay
and other solids in the mud create a veneer of sheathing
on the wall of the hole, known as the wall cake, which

requirements. For instance, two wells drilled off the same
drilling platform, in the same area, might have completely

helps to keep the hole from sloughing -- that is, from

different geological formations which require different

caving in. Another multiple-function ingredient is barite
-- the most popular weighting material. Barite has a high
specific gravity. Its weight helps to keep all fluids, gases,
and other material from seeping into the hole from the
surrounding geological formation. Barite is also relatively

muds. Experience and judgment are important guides to
the mud planning.

A mud plan designated all muds that were to be used,

inert, so that it does not react with other materials it

when they were to be used, and how they were to be used.
Mud requirements changed depending on the depth of the

contacts.

well. For instance, when a drilling operation was in its
early stages, progress was often easy. An operator might
quickly drill down hundreds of feet below the earth's crust.
As the hole drilled deeper, many factors became progressively more challenging. The weight of the drilling pipe,

The challenge for the mud engineer arises because the
factors listed above are always changing. Depth of the
well, changing strata being drilled through, and mechanical
difficulties can all shift the mud properties. To keep the
mud within desired parameters can take frequent adjustment.

or drill string, increased as tons of steel tube pressed down

into the bore hole. A good mud engineer combined experience in the field with a knowledge of mud engineering so

4.

that the probability of a smooth drilling operation was
maximizing while the cost of the mud was minimized. See
Figure 1 for a diagram of the pre-MUDMAN Mud Plan

MUD ENGINEERING ORGANIZATIONAL
PROGRAMS: PRE- AND POST-MUDMAN

Organizational Program.
Mud management entails three basic steps:

4.2 Pre-MUDMAN: Mud Management On-Site
1.

Developing a mud plan2

2.
3.

On-site mud management
Producing a mud report

The next responsibility on the mud engineer's list was mud

management. Pre-MUDMAN, the mud engineer (ME)

"Company Man"
gathers data
I

*=

Meet to pool
data/discuss
experience

Match well with

-

past experience

-Ii/-

and determine
mud needs

Baroid Engineer
gathers data

Figure 1. Pre-MUDMAN Mud Plan Organizational Program Map
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Generate the mud

plan:
o mud use

o mud type
o mud cost for
each level of
well

was isolated on the rig conducting the mud tests, writing
out a report, and sending it -- via mail or facsimile -- to
the field office. (Facsimile use was relatively new and
limited.) Sometimes, after submitting the report, the ME
would call and check in with the office as well.

At least once per 24-hour day, the mud engineer gathers

In order to determine what is happening hundreds or
thousands of feet below the surface, the mud engineer
monitors about 20 mud parameters -- such as density,

The likelihood of running into problems with the mud

a bucket of mud to analyze in the mud-lab (which is always
close at hand and usually on site). When problems are
occurring, the mud can be sampled hourly, or more often,

if necessary.
varies greatly with the type of well being drilled. Once a

promising geological area is identified, one or more
exploratory, or "wildcat," wells will be drilled in search of
deposits. The term "wildcat" comes from the fact that in
a new territory, a driller never knows exactly what will be

solids content, and filtrate characteristics -- to see if they
are within the expected values. There are many possible
causes of deviation from desired levels: for example, the

geology being drilled through can have mineral embedded

encountered. For this same reason, mud management is
especially challenging during exploration.

in it which reacts with the mud; the drilling equipment can
be circulating the mud poorly, ruining its chemistry; or the

mud equipment itself might not be performing filtration
correctly. Issues can arise as isolated incidents or they can

Problems on a rig could range from a minor fluctuation in
the value of a mud parameter to "stuck pipe" or a blowout.
Pre-MUDMAN, when a problem was encountered, the

interact to trigger even more complex challenges.

ME samples
the mud

d

+
ME tests the mud

--+

.

Mud tests OK

ME writes daily

---* ME sends the mud

report

mud report

Problem with the

-+- ME solves problem

I

mud
Diagnose treatment

,-

with ME

4.

A

Call field officesend samples

T

New samples

.

6

r

Review well dataget uptospeed on

well
-

Call district
office-send samples

+

send samples

'

+

Call Houston/

Figure 2. Pre-MUD Mud Management Organizational Program Map
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Treat Mud

mud engineer usually took more mud samples and kept in

closer contact with the field and district office.

4.4 MUDMAN: What it Does

If a

Baroid sells MUDMAN as a service to its customers for
$350 per day -- the same rate as it costs to hire a mud

problem arose at the site, the first responsibility of the

district managers was to obtain the most recent data about

engineer. As the MUDMAN brochure states:

the well and make their own analyses. Often, the mud

engineer would send samples to the field office for
additional analysis. Escalation up Baroid's chain of
command could occur almost immediately if the problem

Designed to work with your Baroid technologist in analyzing and correcting downhole problems, MUDMAN is more
than just a data-processing system. It's the first practical
application of artificial intelligence in the drilling industry.

was severe enough; if necessary, test samples might be air-

shipped to the Houston labs. While the problem continued, consultations between the shore personnel and the
ME on the rig occurred often as diagnoses were designed
and treatments tried. The managers were kept informed
about the results of each attempt. If necessary, more

MUDMAN includes an expert system for drilling mud
analysis, electronic mail facilities, a database to record
mud data, an ability to perform complex calculations such
as hydraulics analysis, and a report-generation facility for

experienced engineers went to the site to assess the
problem first-hand and to demonstrate to the customer
that Baroid was willing to send its best people out on a
problem if needed. See Figure 2 for a pre-MUDMAN

the creation of mud-analysis reports. The MUDMAN
expert system performs three basic functions:

Mud Management Organizational Program Map.

•
•

43 Pre-MUDMAN: Mud-Reporting

•
The last major ME responsibility, mud-reporting, which
occurred at the end of the drilling, was to create a report
that included all the daily logs, relevant billing, and accounting data about the well. The report compiled a
complete and accurate record of the material used and

data input;
analysis of the data -- diagnosis of deviations from
mud plan or previous mud values; and
treatment recommendations:

The mud engineer usually begins a session with MUDMAN by entering the new values for mud parameters.
These can then be compared against either the mud plan
or the previous mud values. The initial diagnosis is a
simple list of those parameters that were off-target.

detailed not only the types, volumes and costs of the mud,
but analyzed the effectiveness of different mud treatments
for different well issues. This document was usually 20 to

MUDMAN then diagnoses probable causes for these
deviations from expected values. After analysis, the

200 pages long, depending on the length of the well's
operation. The tedious, exacting work on reports was the
least favorite part of the ME's job, and it was not uncommon for a manager to remind a mud engineer to finish the

engineer can request treatment recommendations which
give the specific quantities and types of mud to be added

mud report in a timely and complete manner. See Figure

process, an explanation capability is available to tell why a

3 for a pre-MUDMAN Mud-Reporting Organizational

particular diagnosis is indicated or a recommendation is

Program Map.

gwen.

with reasons for their addition. At every point in the

ME gathers daily
mud reports

»

ME analyzed $

Writes mud report:

use reasons

graphs, tables,

Ill

costs, dates, etc.
ME gathers

accounting

data

6 days to 6 months

Figure 3. Pre-MUDMAN Mud-Reporting Organizational Program Map
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Binds and presents
the copy to the
customer

The software for MUDMAN was developed on a VAX
11/780™ and runs on Digital's Micro-VAX II™ hardware.

Before MUDMAN, I kept my own records. A good

In general, a user dialed the Houston office in order to use
MUDMAN, but it had been successfully tried remotely on

helps is that it makes the records more accessible. For

mud engineer keeps good records. Where MUDMAN

example, there was some planning being done recently

a Micro-VAX II in the field as well. The program was
written in a number of different computer languages,

for a new well off a platform in an area where we had
just finished a different well. The engineers creating

including LISP, BLISS, and OPS-5.

that mud plan wanted to know what the weight of the
mud was for a particular depth (drilling depth). In
order to get that information they needed tolind the
daily reports for the other well and dig through them.

4.5 Post-MUDMAN: Mud Engineering Program

It is more likely that, rather than searching out the old
MUDMAN was first introduced on a nontest well in carly
spring 1985. The use of MUDMAN influenced all three
aspects of the ME's job -- planning, management, and
report writing.

data, they would have relied on their previous experi-

ence to estimate the mud weight. With MUDMAN,
they were able to call up the data needed and know
the real numbers of the other well -- they liked that

access.
In examining the effects of MUDMAN use it is helpful to
recall that MUDMAN contains three basic elements: an
ES to aid in mud engineering, a database, and a communications facility. The MUDMAN system is an integrated
support and communications tool. Some of the effects of
MUDMAN seemed caused by the ES component directly
-- such as improved diagnostic capability. Yet, most of the
effects seemed to be enabled by the ES, but were caused
by the availability of the well data and diagnostic status

In addition to the availability of the database, there was a
facility in MUDMAN that helped the mud engineer design
a mud plan from scratch. So far, MUDMAN's greatest
influence on the mud planning part of the job seemed to

come from the fact that data from the drilling of recent
wells was readily accessible. The database of well information was generated through ongoing use of the MUDMAN
diagnostic tool on different wells around the globe. Hence,

which were readily communicated across the Baroid

the ES enabled the creation of the database, which in turn
influenced the process of mud planning. See Figure 4 for

organization; that is, they were caused by the database and

communications capabilities. This latter set of effects were
facilitated by ES use, but not caused by it.

the post-MUDMAN Mud Plan Organizational Program

4.6 Post-MUDMAN: Mud Planning

4.7 Post-MUDMAN: Mud Management On-Site

In mud planning, MUDMAN gave better access to

In post-MUDMAN mud management, for the second ME
responsibility, the engineer still went through the same
process of sampling the mud. However, instead of

Map.

previous well data. One of the mud engineers in Louisiana

using MUDMAN recounted an example:
"Company Man'
gathers data

Meet to pool
i

data/discuss

Match well with
-1.

past experience

experience

Generate the mud

--*

and determine
mud needs

plan:
• mud use
• mud type
• mud cost for

each level of

Baroid Engineer
gathers data

the well

Baroid Engineer
accesses MUDMAN

database
Figure 4. Post-MUDMAN Mud Plan Organizational Program Map
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reporting the data by hand on an American Petroleum
Institute form and sending it via mail or facsimile to the
field office, the data were entered into MUDMAN.

treatment and predict probable effects on the well. This
gave the mud engineer the option of experimenting with
mud treatments before actually performing the activity.
According to one mud engineer, this simulation capability
gave him more confidence in the mud analysis and treatment he recommended. See Figure 5 for the post-MUDMAN organizational program.

When the information was put into the system, the analysis
and the data were available immediately to the shore
management at the field office, the regional office, and
headquarters (because the MUDMAN diagnostic program
resided at Houston). All data were entered on remote
terminals located on the wells. The MUDMAN data were

4.8 Post-MUDMAN: Report Writing

accessible to all Baroid field sites using the proper pass-

word and security information. As a vice president for
Drilling and Completion Services noted:

With MUDMAN, another benefit of the database part of
the system was that interim reports were possible, daily
recaps were also more readable and complete, and the
summary reports could be drawn up only a few hours after

If I want to, I can call up the daily mud report
first thing in the morning. Before, I would have

a well reached the target depth. This last capability -- the
ability to create a mud report rapidly -- was an important

to wait on the mud engineer to fill out his report
and fax [send it by facsimile] to me -- or I could
try to get the engineer on the phone. Generally
I might keep tabs on sensitive or important wells
so that if someone from the client company calls
me and asks about the status of a given well, I can
be right up to date and informed.

sales tool.

At the end of a well, the Baroid engineers wanted to be
able to go to the customer and describe how the mud
service went. When the job was done correctly, Baroid
liked to show the "company man" the figures as soon as
possible to let the customer know what a good job had
been done. If the information was available immediately,
it might influence the buyer to purchase Baroid products
and services for another well, especially if more drilling

The daily facsimile usually went only to the field office
responsible for the well except when it was requested by
another manager. Managers reported that the communication of the analysis and well-status by MUDMAN meant
that more people were informed on the day-to-day well
situation sooner. This seemed to change the nature of

was scheduled in the same area.

problem reporting. For instance, when a problem arose,

Reporting Organizational Program Map.

If it took weeks or

months to generate the report, much of the data's value

might be lost. See Figure 6 for the Post-MUDMAN Mud-

the engineering managers already were familiar with the

specifics of the geology, mud, and recent drilling history of
the well. Again, the ES part of MUDMAN provided the
template to enter the status information and provided a

As the director of the MUDMAN project explained:

The mud salesman would often be persona non
gram at an oil company's office. They would not
want to be bothered by oil service salesmen telling
the same old tale. With the MUDMAN report,
it gives our satesmen active and current information to bring to the oil company engineers. It
helps us keep our contacts active and relationships

diagnosis of the well situation. Yet it was the con:munication of this standardized data and diagnosis that affected
the diagnostic procedure of Baroid because communication

of the data kept more people better infurmed.
Because mud engineering was an "on-line" activity, time
was often precious. The fact that other experts, back in
the regional, district, and home offices, were more up to
date and informed of the well status was considered a
critical aid in quick and correct analysis and control of well

current with daily reports and then with a prompt
final report.

problems. In effect, the importance of the change in
reporting method was amplified by the pressure of the
task. Furthermore, the mud engineers throughout the

All three organizational programs -- mud planning, mud
management, and mud reporting -- were significantly
affected by the use of MUDMAN at Baroid. Where the
organizational programs highlighted the process changes

company could review MUDMAN's opinion of the situation so that they had a common diagnostic reference base

at the site, the organizational information processing
measures try to assess the effect of MUDMAN use.

in addition to common data upon which to build any
further analysis or monitoring of the well.

5.

Another useful feature of the MUDMAN expert system
was simulation. It was possible to simulate a mud treatment so that when a mud engineer decided on the specific

POST-MUDMAN: INFORMATION PROCESSING
CAPACITY

We now move to the second measure of the impact of
MUDMAN -- information-processing capacity. As mentioned earlier, Galbraith (1977) defines the information-

solution to the problem, he or she was able to enter the
recommended treatment. With this information added to

the current well data, MUDMAN could simulate the

processing capacity of an organization to be the diversity
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of the outputs, the number of different resources, and the

level of task performance. As noted above, the determination of the information-processing capacity of the task

Houston Office

organization at Baroid consisted of evaluating of the three

components that make up information-processing capacity:
inputs, outputs, and level of task performance.

A
Regional Office

In the MUDMAN case, there was evidence of increased
information-processing capacity. The list of inputs, out-

A

puts, and task performance is shown in Table 2.
5.1 Inputs

District Office

Early use of the MUDMAN system revealed that there
were a number of new inputs to the task of mud engineer-

ing. Figure 7 shows the chain of command from the well

Mud Engineeron Well

site back to the Houston headquarters. There were three

mud engineering managers responsible for the ME's
performance on the platform: the district manager, the
regional manager, and the Houston office. These three
offices had on-line access to the mud engineering situation.
Mud engineering managers reported that they could keep
abreast of the situation on the well.

Figure 7. Baroid Chain of Command from Well Site to
Houston Office

Table 2

Pre-MUDMAN

Post-MUDMAN

Inputs-Increase
o
o

Mud engineer
Previous well data

+ + Mud engineer and mud-engineering management
+ + Previous well data and trend data '

+ + MUDMAN

Outputs-Increased
o
o

Mud plan
API daily mud form

=
+
+

Mud plan
More exact/accessible daily mud report
On-well support

+ + Interim summaries and trend sheets

Task Performance-Significantly Increase
o
o

At least one mud report perr 12-hour period
Daily reporting

o

Finish mud report (1-20 weeks)

= At least one mud report per 12-hour period
+ Daily reporting -- prompt/analysis now passed on
+ + Better diagnosis -- four previously unsolved
problems were solved using MUDMAN
+ + Finish mud report faster (1 hour to 2-3 days)

The designations before each item on the list are indicators of the direction and the strength of the change in that
category. For example = is the same, + + is strongly increased, - is decreased, etc.
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The increased involvement of the managers in review of
the mud data meant that Baroid could be that much more

With MUDMAN the mud engineer found it easy to keep

effective in dealing with severe or immediate problems on

tion. As a result, when a drilling operation ended, compiling the mud report only took a few hours. The database
created through use of the ES was complete and consis-

the well because the extra experts were already informed
about the well status and recent operations. This added

consistent daily records of all well and inventory informa-

involvement seemed to occur in the early MUDMAN

tent.

wells. At the time of this study, it was not certain whether
this improvement was temporary and caused by the novelty

engineering manager to have the final mud report almost
immediately and in a form ready to present to the cus-

of the system, or if the effect would linger.

Consequently, it was not uncommon for a mud

tomer.

It seems

reasonable to assume that on difficult wells, the managers

would avail themselves on the most up-to-date information

Another major benefit was improved diagnosis of the well
problems. The director of the MUDMAN project reported that, in four separate instances, MUDMAN had
been integral in solving a previously unsolved diagnostic
problem. The most dramatic example was on a well in the
North Sea. Baroid's client was drilling a well experiencing

available as part of their ongoing effort to keep informed

about potential problems.

Therefore, the effect could

continue for the more challenging wells.

Concerning data, the mud engineers had on-line use of the
trend analysis. In the diagnostic process of the expert
system, MUDMAN indicated when the current mud
parameters violated expected values. Expected values were
based on the mud plans, which usually have a high and low

a "carbonate problem" -- that is, carbonates were contami-

nating the mud. The drilling operator had been treating
the carbonate problem on and off for ten years. A few
days after the MUDMAN service was purchased for the
well and the system was given a few days' worth of mud
parameters, MUDMAN suggested that there might be a
leakage of CO2 gas from the surrounding formation into
the bore hole. At first, the drilling operator did not believe

value to bracket the desired value. In addition, there was

an analysis of trend data and, even if a mud parameter
were within its bracketed values, MUDMAN might issue
a warning that a sharper-than-expected increase of one or

more values of the mud parameters could indicate a
potential problem. In this way, MUDMAN consistently

that this was the problem, but after investigation, C02 was

found to be the cause of the carbonate contamination.

analyzed historical data during mud diagnosis. Further, the

Once the correct diagnosis was reached, the remedy was
clear -- raise the specific gravity of the mud to increase the

mud engineer used more of the previous well data in the

analyses because the data were readily available during thc

mud weight sufficiently to drive the CO2 back into the

diagnosis phase of the session. Altogether, inputs to the

formation surrounding the bore hole. This was done and
the carbonate problem was solved. This evidence suggests
that use of the MUDMAN expert system can improve the
consistency and exactness of the mud diagnostic process.

mud engineering process increased -- some because of the
ES, some as a result of the database.

5.2 Outputs

Use seemed to improve the execution of the organizational
program, although a study of expert performance with and

The outputs in the form of daily reports and interim mud
reports were more consistent and could be accessed faster.
Pre-MUDMAN, a well would rarely have an interim report
that detailed the muds used, their cost, and the symptoms
encountered at the drilling site. Post-MUDMAN, it was
common to create an interim report, both for use on the
rig by the mud engineer talking with the operator on-site,
and for use by Baroid sales people and service people
when going to the oil company buying the service. The
result was a new, on-going documentation and reporting of
the well to both Baroid and the customer -- leading to an

without the aid of MUDMAN would be necessary to show
definitively that MUDMAN improved performance.
In addition to the observed increases in task performance,
senior Baroid managers conjectured that MUDMAN use
might increase the information-processing capacity of the

entire mud engineering cadre by allowing more mud
engineers to operate more effectively in the field. Howev-

er, in 1986, the drilling industry was in such a deep
depression that the potential for MUDMAN to help

assessment that outputs from the process increased.

Baroid deal with peak needs, in terms of mud diagnostic
capabilities, could not be tested until the market for oil

53 Task Performance

rebounded. Even without a great increase in demand for
mud services, the task performance for mud diagnosis
seemed to have significantly increased from the preMUDMAN state to the post-MUDMAN state.

Pre-MUDMAN, it usually took anywhere from six weeks
to six months to compile and write the mud report for the
client. Much of the time was spent retrieving numbers,
completing records, inventory, and resolving any discrepancies. For example, the inventory accounting records
might not match the mud engineer's records of material,
causing the ME to search painstakingly through every
report to see what was wrong and why.

6.

SUMMARY

This field study suggests that, in this company, site use of
the MUDMAN system increased the information-processing capacity of the task organization performing the tasks

of mud planning, mud management, and mud reporting.

89

Keen, P. G. W., and Scott-Morton, M. Decision Suppon
An Organizational Perspective.
Reading,
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Much more work is needed to investigate the information-

processing effects of system use in terms of the new
information-processing tasks that use creates and the
information-processing tasks it obviates. This single study,

Luconi, F.; Malone, T.; and Scott-Morton, M. S. "Expert
Support Systems." CISR Working Paper, Number 122,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1985.

in one site, was only able to begin to explore these complexities.
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Baroid™ and MUDMAN™ are registered trademarks
of NL Industries.

2.

In the field it is actually called a "mud program," but
here, as in Kahn and McDermott (1986), the term plan
will be used to avoid confusion with software prograrns.

3.

Kahn and McDermott co-developed MUDMAN for
Baroid. See Kahn and McDermott (1986) for more
details.
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